Tag: R0

ILLEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN THE POST-MEMORANDUM GREECE Changes and constants in a chronic phenomenon

Nikolaos YOYAS

Architect NTUA, Msc Environmental Design, Urban Planning PHD Candidate

01@yio.gr

Abstract

The ¨stirring¨ of the problem of illegal constructions in Greece, during the last decade, that followed the issue of five consecutive laws regarding their integration in the country΄s official urban planning in the period 2009-2017, has led to a short-lived race of declaring and legitimizing illegal, constructions on behalf of the hundreds of thousands of popular owners. This institutional reform becomes, increasingly, significant in combination with the contemporary fiscal reform and the relevant tax burdening of realty owners. The timeless popular investment shelter of building ownership, for the first time after WWII, loses its immunity and becomes an unbearable tax weight, transforming popular illegal constructions into the national tool for transforming the country΄s real-estate map. Our ability to translate the outcome of this ¨crisis¨, through our route through all the past time, will define the quality of life in our new urban environment, but most important, our own standard of living and our future.

Keywords: Illegal constructions, urban planning, economic crisis

JEL classification: R0, R5
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GREENSPACE AGREEMENT, EXTERNAL DISECONOMY AND RESIDENTS’ RISK ASSESMENT

Kenichi SHIMAMOTO

Associate Professor, Hirao School of Management, Konan University

kenichi@center.konan-u.ac.jp

Abstract

The greenspace agreement is an effective method to promote the conservation and creation of greenspace. In this paper, the mechanism of the formation of the greenspace agreement is analysed using the coalition game. As a result, it was identified that the greenspace agreement requires a certain level of supporters in order to be formed and the most desirable situation is when there is a universal agreement. It also identified the possibility of the existence of free riders which could prevent a unanimous support of the greenspace agreement. The number of supporters of the greenspace agreement and number of free riders are dependent on the size of the external diseconomy caused by the lack of consideration for greenspace, the government’s enforceability of taxes on the diseconomy and the decline in land prices due to the external diseconomies from the neglect of greenspace. Furthermore, it was found that it was also influenced by the residents and stakeholder’s risk assessment based on their view towards the government’s enforceability of taxes and the rate of decline in land prices.

Keywords: Greenspace agreement, coalition game, free rider, external diseconomy

JEL classification: H2, Q5, R0

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