Tag: Local Public Good

USING ENTERPRISE ZONES TO ATTRACT THE CREATIVE CLASS: SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES

Amitrajeet A. BATABYAL

Arthur J. Gosnell Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY 14623-5604, USA

aabgsh@rit.edu

Seung Jick YOO

Associate Professor, Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

sjyoo@sookmyung.ac.kr

Corresponding Author

Abstract

We study decision-making by a regional authority (RA) that uses enterprise zones to attract members of the creative class—referred to as entrepreneurs—to its region. The enterprise zones provide a local public good (LPG)  to entrepreneurs who become members. First, we compute the utility maximizing number of entrepreneurs  to attract and the optimal provision level of the LPG. Second, if the LPG  is chosen optimally, then, given  we determine an expression for the utility of an entrepreneur. Third, we calculate how much an entrepreneur would be willing to pay to become a member of an enterprise zone and then discuss the potential existence of an efficient and revenue-neutral equilibrium. Finally, we comment on some theoretical difficulties stemming from the twin facts that the number of enterprise zones created and the number of entrepreneurs attracted to these zones have to be integers.

Keywords: Creative Class, Enterprise Zone, Entrepreneur, Local Public Good, Membership

JEL classification: R11, R58

 pp. 13-19

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A NOTE ON LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD INDUCED SPILLOVERS BETWEEN A LEADING AND A LAGGING REGION

Amitrajeet A. BATABYAL

Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, 92 Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, NY 14623-5604, USA.

aabgsh@rit.edu

Abstract

We analyze spatial spillovers in an aggregate economy consisting of a leading and a lagging region where the spillovers stem from the provision of a local public good. Specifically, if the leading region provides the public good then the lagging region obtains some spillover benefits and vice versa. We first solve for the Nash equilibrium levels of the local public goods in the two regions when public investment decisions are simultaneous; next, we determine the equilibrium welfare levels in each region. Second, on the assumption that the public investment decisions are centralized, we compute the levels of the local public goods that maximize aggregate welfare. Finally, we describe an interregional transfer scheme that leads each region to choose non-cooperatively in a Nash equilibrium the same public investment levels as those that arise when aggregate welfare is maximized.

Keywords: Lagging Region, Leading Region, Local Public Good, Spatial Spillover

JEL classification: R11, O18

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